The development of the small and medium enterprise sector is believed to be crucial for economic growth and poverty alleviation. Those who seek to develop the sector must consent with the general perception that small-and medium-scale enterprises are at a disadvantage compared with larger firms. In theory, however, smaller firms may also have advantages over larger firms. For instance, they may be less affected by excessive regulations because they can more easily slip into informal arrangements. This paper draws on a new private sector survey covering 80 countries and one territory to study the question whether business obstacles are related to firm size. The main finding is that there is indeed a bias against small firms. Overall (that is, for the world sample) small firms report more problems than medium-sized firms, which in turn report more problems than large firms. In particular, smaller firms face significantly more problems than larger firms with financing, taxes and regulations, inflation, corruption and street crime. Thus these impediments should be prime targets for policies directed at leveling the playing field. Some of the most severe perceived impediments to doing business affect firms of all sizes, and consequently call for across-the-board policy improvements. In addition to the world wide analysis, the paper presents an analysis by regions and by individual countries.
Chapter 1. Introduction
Many governments worldwide have implemented policies to support small-and mediumscale enterprises (SMEs). Particularly in developing countries, SMEs constitute a large share of all firms and employment. Providing assistance to these firms is therefore thought to generate economic growth and sustain or even create employment. However, some of the assumed economics benefits of SMEs may be, as Hallberg (2000) points out, "myth rather than reality".
For instance, small firms are not necessarily more labor-intensive than large ones. Additionally, whereas it is often true that job creation is higher than average for SMEs, job losses are also higher in these firms because they tend to shut down more easily than large companies.
Nevertheless, intervention on behalf of these enterprises may be justified if market forces or institutional failures bias the size-distribution of firms and put small and medium firms at a disadvantage compared with large firms. For instance, economies of scale and entry cost are market forces that favor large firms. Moreover, large entrepreneurs usually wield more political influence; thus government rules and regulations may also be biased in favor of large firms. For this reason, one of the cornerstones of the World Bank strategy for promoting small-and medium-scale enterprises is to "level the playing field"; that is, to create a business environment that gives equal opportunities to entrepreneurs of all sizes. 1 1 Recent empirical literature has suggested that a "level playing field" is one of the crucial preconditions for rapid private sector development. For instance, work by Knack and Keefer (1995) has shown that the existence of a meaningful rule of law is among the most robust determinants of economic growth in a large cross-section of countries. A number of other recent studies find significant effects of institutional quality on economic growth. See, for example, Mauro (1995) , Barro (1991) , Alesina et al. (1996) , and Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder (1998a) . Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) have presented empirical evidence showing that countries with a high level of corruption and weak institutions tend to have large informal sectors. 08/13/02, 11:07 AM But whereas arguments that show that small firms suffer more than large firms are more familiar than arguments in the other direction, there are also reasons why small firms could be better off than large ones. For example, small firms may be less affected by regulations because they can more easily slip into informal arrangements-for instance, escaping the notice of corrupt tax assessors, who might focus on larger firms that promise higher returns.
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on whether small or large firms face more problems with market and government-made obstacles, and for which set of obstacles the firm size bias is most severe. Specifically, this analysis addresses the following questions:
1. Does firm size matter? Overall, is there a systematic relationship between the size of a firm and the severity of obstacles encountered? 2. In case there is a systematic relationship, what does it look like? Is there a decreasing or an increasing function between firm size and obstacle? Or is the relationship hump-or Ushaped, indicating that forces both in favor and against small firms are important?
3. Are there differences between obstacles? If biases exist according to firm size, are they different depending on the nature of the market or government-induced obstacle? In policy and operational terms, on which obstacles should policy-makers focus SME support?
4. Are there differences between regions? 08/13/02, 11:07 AM The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents theoretical arguments on why firm size could affect the sensitivity to risks. Several hypothesis are suggested that show possible patterns of the relationship between firm size and obstacle levels. Chapter 3 describes the data used in this study. It comes from a new data set compiled by the World Bank. It contains private sector surveys of 80 countries and one territory and over 10,000 firms.
2 Chapter 4 introduces the estimation method and the two model specifications: a basic and an extended version of the model. The latter tests whether the results of the basic models are robust. Chapter 5 discusses the estimation results for a worldwide sample as well as separate regions. Finally, chapter 6 draws policy implications.
2 One advantage of this data set is that there is detailed firm-level information and enough observations to allow regional and even country-by-country analysis. In a previous, similar data set that was also collected by the World Bank, this detailed analysis was not possible because of an insufficient number of observations (see Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder, 1999 The basis for any program to develop and foster small-and medium-sized companies is the assumption that these firms have more problems than larger ones. However, in theory, small firms do not necessarily have to be worse off than medium and large firms.
Several arguments have been advanced as to why smaller firms might have more problems than larger firms:
Economies of Scale and Entry Costs. Business obstacles may be particularly severe for small firms because they represent fixed costs that larger firms can absorb more easily. The source of the obstacle can be market-or government-induced. An example of a marketbased obstacle for small firms could be financing, since there are fixed costs associated with loan review. Government-induced obstacles could include bureaucratic discretion, since small firms may be unable to bribe their way through bureaucracy.
3
Political Influence. Large firms might be more successful than smaller ones in influencing politics and obtaining new rules in their favor. Due to their importance to the economy and their power 4 , they might be able to arrange special deals with governments. For example, in a recession, they might threaten to lay off workers if they do not receive tax reductions.
3 De Soto (1987) explored the enormous obstacles in terms of red tape that small entrepreneurs faced when trying to obtain a business license. That study revealed huge entry costs for small entrepreneurs who lacked access to higher levels of the administration and who could not bribe their way through the system. 4 As Olson (1965) has shown, small groups with strong interests are more successful in forming strong pressure groups than large groups due to the "free-rider" problem. Exposure and Visibility. Large firms may be more exposed to corruption since they usually have higher profits than small firms, they are more visible, and they may be more rewarding targets for blackmailing and kickbacks.
Depending on the direction and strength of the influence of these forces, different patterns of the relationship between firm size and obstacle levels can be imagined. First, there might be a decreasing or an increasing relationship between firm size and the level of obstacle over the whole size range. Second, one might observe a situation where firms of medium size are either worse or better off than both small and large firms, i.e. a hump or u-shaped relation between firm size and obstacle level. Third, two adjoining firm sizes might have the same obstacle levels. That is, either small and medium firms or medium and large firms experience the same amount of problems.
5 Finally, all three firm size categories might face the same 5 One reason for this could be that the division of firms into the three categories small, medium and large is arbitrary to some extent, especially when the size categories are the same for all countries of the world. For example, a Nicaraguan firm with more than 200 employees might be large by national standards, but a firm with the same number of employees in Spain might be ranked as a medium-sized firm there. Accordingly, differences among obstacles may not always run smoothly along the edges of the size categories. Another possible explanation is that two neighboring firm size categories indeed do not differ from each other for some obstacle. For example, street crime could be a higher problem for small firms up to a certain size, but then may not matter if a firm is medium or large.
08/13/02, 11:07 AM obstacle levels. This is the case if forces that lead to differences between sizes are weak or cancel each other out.
Further Firm Characteristics that Could Influence Obstacle Levels
Differences in size may not be the only reason why firms may experience varied obstacle levels. Other firm characteristics may be more relevant than size, or may be highly correlated with size. Three firm characteristics may be particularly relevant. The first is the age of the firm, the second and third concern the ownership structure.
Older firms have more experience and have had time to learn how to deal best with the specific obstacles in their business environment. They also have had time to build up a reputation, which facilitates financing. Therefore, older firms might experience lower obstacle levels than younger firms. However, evidence of a negative relationship between firm age and the severity of obstacles to doing business might be found for firms in formerly communist countries. Firms that were established before 1989-that is, firms from the communist era-are often heavily indebted and therefore might experience higher obstacle levels than firms that were launched in the post-communist era.
There are many reasons to believe that government participation in ownership has an influence on the level of obstacles for doing business. Firms partly or fully controlled by government might be less exposed to corruption and blackmailing than private firms. They might also receive special treatment with regard to taxes and regulations, have easier access to 08/13/02, 11:07 AM infrastructure, be more satisfied with the functioning of the judiciary than private firms, and be less exposed to various forms of crime. Government-controlled firms may have better access to financing than private firms because of the soft budget constraints. However in an environment of contracting public financing, they may also face more difficulties in raising money than private firms.
Firms that are owned partly or fully by a foreign entity might find it more difficult to adapt to local customs and to the political system. Therefore, they might report higher obstacle levels. Moreover, because foreign-owned firms are likely to have higher import and export rates than the average firm, the exchange rate obstacle could be worse for them than for others. But there are also arguments for a positive relationship between obstacles and foreign control.
Multinationals may have very good relations with the government and they may more easily and credibly threaten to exit and relocate. Furthermore, they may be able to avoid taxes by shifting profits to a country with lower tax rates. Further firm characteristics we use to investigate the relationship between firm size and obstacle levels are the age of the firm (question 7 of the questionnaire), whether any government agency or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm (question 8), 7 and whether 6 The so-called screener portion of the survey. 7 In other words, the government could be a minority or majority shareholder. This will be referred to from now on as "government participation in ownership." 08/13/02, 11:07 AM any foreign company or individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm (question 9).
8
The average firm age median for the whole sample is 10 years; the mean is 19.75 years, as shown in table 3.1. With regard to ownership, 12.37 percent of the firms have at least some government ownership; 18.74 percent of the firms reported foreign ownership. Referring to the second part of the survey, this paper focuses on survey question number 44, which asks entrepreneurs to rate the seriousness of a variety of obstacles for their businesses.
9 Questions are in multiple choice format and offer four possible answers (box 3.1).
This allows a simple quantification by assigning ratings from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle).
8 Another variable we examined is the location of firm management-whether in the capital city, a large city, or a small city/country side. Nearly all firms interviewed (95 percent) were located in the capital. 9 A similar question was asked in a previous World Bank survey and was used to analyze the level of obstacles around the world (Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder, 1998b) . However, as noted above, in the previous exercise, there were not enough observations to distinguish between the responses of firms of various sizes. Please judge on a four-point scale, where "4" means a major obstacle, "3" means a moderate obstacle, "2" means a minor obstacle, and "1" means it is no obstacle, how problematic the following factors are for the operation and growth of your business. How about (read A-K)?
A. Financing B.
Infrastructure (e.g. telephone, electricity, water, roads, lands) C.
Taxes and regulations D.
Policy instability or uncertainty E. Inflation F.
Exchange rate G.
Functioning 
Descriptive Statistics on the Level of Obstacles
This section aims to give an overview of the average level of obstacles for all firms in the world sample, as shown in figure 3.1, and also for firms of different sizes. It also presents regional averages of perceived obstacles for all firm sizes.
10 10 A more detailed data description, including country level data, can be found in Schiffer and Weder (2001) .
08/13/02, 11:07 AM Table 3 .2 ranks the obstacles according to the severity of obstacles by showing the percentage of firms that reported a major obstacle. 11 In this ranking, financing appears to be the top problem worldwide: one third of all firms in the survey said that this was a major obstacle for their business. For small-and medium-scaled enterprises, this figure is slightly higher, while for large firms it is somewhat lower. This gives a first indication that small and medium-sized firms find it more difficult to receive financing than larger firms. One notch below financing are inflation, policy instability and taxes and regulation. Again, roughly one third of firms reported major problems in these areas. Interestingly, small and medium firms have more problems with taxes and regulations than large firms. This could be an indication that large firms can more easily avoid taxes: for example, by reporting profits in those locations where tax rates are lowest.
The four top obstacles are followed by the exchange rate, corruption and both crime variables, Table 3 .3 shows worldwide and regional averages of the eleven obstacles to business for the three firm sizes. For each obstacle, the three groups of firms are shaded according to their average answer. Black means that the firm size category in question experiences the highest obstacle level of all three; gray, that it experiences the second highest obstacle level; and white, the lowest obstacle level.
For six obstacles, the world averages are highest and therefore strongest for small firms: financing, inflation, corruption, both organized and street crime, and anti-competitive practices.
12 Note that the various regions and countries have different percentages of small, medium and large firms in their sample. For example, while 54 percent of the firms interviewed in East Asia are small firms, in Latin America only 31 percent of all firms in the sample are small. This means that the world and regional averages presented here may be biased by particular regions and countries. For instance, imagine a country with a larger than average share of large firms and huge problems in infrastructure. This country would artificially drive up the average value of large firms on the infrastructure obstacle. That is, the world and regional averages presented here are not controlled for country-level effects. Thus the averages of obstacle levels presented here give only a first indication of the pattern of results. 08/13/02, 11:07 AM Three obstacles hit medium firms hardest: taxes and regulations, policy instability or uncertainty, and the exchange rate. The remaining two obstacles-infrastructure and the functioning of the judiciary-appear to have the greatest negative impact on large firms. Small firms report higher obstacle levels than medium and large firms very clearly in three of the six regions in the dataset: Latin America, South Asia and the OECD. In East Asia, five obstacles are strongest for small and another six for medium-sized firms, in the transition economies, six obstacles are highest for small firms, and five for medium-sized firms. I.e., for these two regions, there is a clear pattern that larger firms face lower obstacle levels than both small and medium-sized firms. In Africa, finally, for the nine obstacles tested, three are most severe for small firms, two for medium-sized firms, and four for large firms.
08/13/02, 11:07 AM
Chapter 4. Model Specification
Our model estimates the influence that firm size and other firm characteristics have on the level of obstacles that firms face. In the survey that we use as a basis of our study, firms rated eleven obstacles for doing business on a scale from 1 to 4, using only discrete numbers.
Thus, the dependent variable is ordered from 1 to 4, and the estimation can be done with an ordered probit model. 13 Ordered probit is used for situations where the dependent variable has a natural order, but this order reflects only a ranking, so that estimating with ordinary least squares is not possible.
Our model has the following form: We estimate two types of regressions for each of the eleven obstacles: a basic regression and an extended regression. The explanatory variables of the basic regression are the firm size dummies for small and large firms and the dummies of all countries that have observations on 13 See Kennedy (1998, p. 236) .
14 See Greene (1993, pp. 672-76) .
08/13/02, 11:07 AM the specific obstacle except one. 15 The country dummies are included to control for all country characteristics that determine the level of obstacles within a country (such as income, the macroeconomic situation, or culture) and are common to all firms in the country. The basic regression is estimated for the worldwide sample as well as for the regional sample for each obstacle. In addition, country regressions are estimated for the basic model for the three obstacles finance, policy instability and corruption. We have chosen these obstacles as they together cover a wide part of the business environment of firms.
16
The extended regression adds three variables to the basic regression: firm age, a dummy for whether the government has a stake in the firm, and a dummy for whether a foreign entity has a stake in the firm. The aim of estimating this is to test whether the results gained from the basic regression are robust. The testing is done for the worldwide sample for all eleven obstacles.
15 Dummy variables are variables that can take the value 0 or 1. For example, the small firm dummy variable is 1 for firms that are small and 0 for medium and large firms. Likewise, the large firm dummy variable is 1 for large firms and 0 for small and medium firms. Thus an observation where both the dummies for small and large firms are 0 must be a medium-sized firm. Therefore a dummy for medium-sized firms needs and must not be added to the model. For the same reason, when there are n different countries in the sample, only n minus 1 country dummies must be added to the ordered probit model. 16 Country regressions are estimated for those countries that have at least 10 small, medium and large firms. 08/13/02, 11:07 AM
Chapter 5. Estimation Results

Basic Regression: Results for Different Firm Sizes
This chapter discusses the estimation results of the basic regression presented in chapter 4. For every obstacle, we estimate a worldwide and several regional regressions. The explanatory variables are dummies for small and large firms 17 and country dummies to take into consideration country-specific influences.
18
Our interest is to see if the coefficients of the dummies for small and large firms are significant and whether they are positive or negative. A positive and significant dummy means that firms with that characteristic experience a higher obstacle level than medium-sized firms.
19 Table 5 .1 presents the estimated coefficients and its z-values (in parentheses) for the size dummies for the worldwide regressions and the regional regressions just mentioned. The coefficients of the country dummies are not presented, so as to keep the tables manageable. The higher the z-value, the smaller is the probability of an α-error. One star indicates that the α-error 17 When both dummies are zero for a certain observation, this indicates that the observation belongs to a mediumsized firm. Therefore the dummy for a firm of medium size is not included in the ordered probit regression. 18 We also estimated country regressions for three selected obstacles for those countries that have a least ten small, medium and large firms each. The explanatory variables for these country regressions are dummies for small and large firms. The results are not shown in this paper, but they are presented in Schiffer & Weder (2001) . In short, for the majority of countries, we could not find significant differences between firms of different sizes and their perception of the business environment. This may well be due to low power to find differences in such small samples. Nevertheless, there were a number of countries that did show significant differences, mainly supporting the results of the regional and world regressions. 19 For example, when the coefficient of the dummy for small firms is positive and significant, this indicates that small firms have significantly higher obstacle levels than medium-sized firms. If in the same regression the dummy for large firms is negative and significant, this means that large firms reported significantly less 08/13/02, 11:07 AM is at most 10 percent; two stars, that it is at most 5 percent; and three stars, at most 1 percent.
The coefficients shaded black are positively significant at the ten percent level. The coefficients shaded gray are negatively significant at the ten percent level. 
Analysis by World and Regions
Continued
problems than medium-sized firms. If a coefficient is insignificant, this means that there is no significant difference between these firms and medium-sized firms. 08/13/02, 11:07 AM The worldwide regressions for financing, taxes and regulations, inflation, corruption, street crime and anti-competitive practices all reveal the same pattern: whereas the dummy for small firms is positively significant, the dummy for large firms is negatively significant. This means that small firms have more and large firms fewer problems than medium-sized firms, i.e.
there is a negative relationship between firm size and risk level. The pattern is shown in figure   5 .1. Given that all firm size dummies in these regressions but one are significant at the 1 percent level, this is a very strong result. 20 The negative relationship between firm size and these obstacles is also reflected in the regional regressions, though the results are less pronounced. Smaller firms have more problems than medium-sized firms, and these have more problems than large firms.
19
20 The exception is the dummy for small firms in taxes and regulations, which is significant at the 10 percent level only.
08/13/02, 11:07 AM In the worldwide sample, small firms experience significantly larger problems with organized crime and the exchange rate than medium-sized firms (1 percent and 5 percent significance). Large firms do not differ significantly from medium-sized firms with respect to these two obstacles. The pattern is therefore as in figure 5.2.
08/13/02, 11:07 AM 08/13/02, 11:07 AM Three obstacles do not show any significance in the world regressions: infrastructure, policy instability and judiciary (figure 5.3). This is also reflected in the regional regressions of these three obstacles. For each of them, only one regional regression is significant. There is no systematic relationship between obstacle-perception an firm size.
Analysis by Regions
Of all regions, Latin America and the Caribbean and the transition economies show the strongest negative relationship between firm size and obstacle. The pattern where small firms have significantly higher obstacle levels than medium-sized firms, and medium-sized firms have significantly higher obstacle levels than large firms can be seen in three out of eleven regressions in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in two out of eleven regressions in the transition economies ( figure 5.4 ). An exception to that trend arises in Latin America and the Caribbean for infrastructure: Whereas the small firm dummy is positively significant, the large firm dummy is negatively significant, indicating that smaller firms are less hindered by infrastructure than larger firms. This pattern can be seen in the Transition Economies for corruption, street crime, organized crime and anticompetitive practices, and in Latin America for financing, inflation and corruption.
In Asia, small firms face higher obstacles to doing business than medium and large firms, which do not report significantly different obstacle levels. Whereas the dummy for small firms 08/13/02, 11:07 AM is positively significant for three obstacles in East Asia and for six obstacles in South Asia, the dummy for large firms is not significant even once. This means that whereas it is a disadvantage to be a small, it is no advantage to be large rather than medium-sized. The pattern is as in figure   5 .5. This pattern can be seen in East Asia for financing, corruption and street crime; and in South Asia for inflation, judiciary, corruption, street crime, organized crime and anti-competitive practices.
In Africa, large firms tend to have lower obstacle levels than medium and small firms, which have about the same obstacle levels. Whereas the dummy for large firms is negatively significant for four of the obstacles, the dummy for small firms is positively significant just once.
The remaining region, the OECD, shows no strong results for the size dummies.
Between 846 and 900 countries are involved in a regression. Because their variance was not large enough, it was impossible to estimate regressions for the following four obstacles:
functioning of the judiciary, corruption, street crime, and organized crime. For each of these potential obstacles, more than half of the firms questioned stated that they represented no 08/13/02, 11:07 AM obstacle to them. In the remaining seven regressions for the OECD, three contain significant firm size dummies. They support the hypothesis that bigger firm size lowers obstacle levels.
Extended Regression: Sensitivity Analysis
This section tests whether additional variables can help explain the obstacle levels and whether the significance of the firm size dummy variables are affected when more variables are added to the basic regression of the previous section.
Three variables are jointly added to the previous regression: firm age, a dummy for whether a government or state agency has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, and a dummy for whether a foreign entity has a financial stake in the ownership. As explained in chapter 2, there are reasons to believe that these three additional firm characteristics can influence the level of obstacles to doing business experienced. Unfortunately, the sample for African firms does not include the exact firm age, so this analysis is done without the African countries. The results are presented in table 5.2. As before, country dummies are added to the regression but are not reported.
Of the three additional variables, the dummy for government participation in ownership turns out to be the most significant, followed by the dummy for foreign control and firm age.
08/13/02, 11:07 AM Government participation in ownership is negatively significant for almost all obstacles:
for infrastructure, taxes and regulations, policy instability, the exchange rate, corruption, street crime and organized crime at the 1 percent level; for anti-competitive practices at the 5 percent level, and for inflation at the 10 percent level. This means that firms that have the government as an owner face lower obstacle levels than privately owned firms. The only exception to this pattern is finance, for which the government participation in ownership dummy has a highly significant positive coefficient. This indicates that on average government-owned firms find it harder to raise financing than private firms.
Foreign ownership is negatively associated with most obstacles. Firms with foreign control have easier access to financing than locally owned firms, are less hindered by taxes and regulations and suffer less from inflation, corruption and street crime. For the exchange rate, the foreign control dummy is positively significant: that is, foreign-controlled firms have more problems with the exchange rate than the average firm.
Firm age is significant only for three obstacles: negatively for finance and anticompetitive practices and positively for the exchange rate. This means that younger firms find financing more difficult to obtain than older ones, which is very plausible in view of the fact that their reputations are not as well established. Younger firms also have more problems with anticompetitive practices but fewer problems with the exchange rate.
Looking at the firm size dummies in the extended regressions in table 5.2, the dummy for small firms is negatively significant for the following six obstacles: inflation, the exchange rate, 08/13/02, 11:07 AM corruption, street crime, organized crime and anti-competitive practices. The small firm dummy is positively significant for infrastructure. The dummy for large firms is negatively significant for five obstacles: finance, taxes and regulations, inflation, street crime and anti-competitive practices. Overall, this shows that bigger firms have fewer problems with obstacles to doing business. The only exception is infrastructure, which small firms experience to be less of a problem than medium-sized and large firms.
Comparing this to the results of the basic regression from earlier in chapter 5, 21 the introduction of the additional regressors reduces the significance of the firm size dummies, though only to a small degree. 22 The main finding of the basic regression-namely, that smaller firms have higher obstacles to doing business than larger ones-remains valid, and the results from the first part of this chapter turn out to be robust.
23
21 Due to data problems, the extended regressions had to be estimated without the firms from the African region.
Therefore, correctly, they should be compared to the basic regressions where the sample is also restricted to the world without the African countries. We have done these estimations, and they are presented in appendix B. We found that the results with and without Africa are very similar, so that a comparison of the extended regressions with the basic regressions from earlier in chapter 5 does not hinder the analysis in any way. 22 For infrastructure, the dummy for small firms turns from being insignificant to being positively significant at the 5 percent level. 23 Looking at the correlation matrix of the regressors, the following can be seen for the relationship between the firm size dummies and the additional three regressors. The small firm and the large firm dummy are correlated with firm age by -0.261 and 0.272, respectively; with the government participation in ownership dummy, by 0.257 and -0.108; and with the foreign control dummy, by 0.208 and -0.226. This indicates that smaller firms tend to be younger and that they tend to be more under the control of the state and of foreign entities than the average firm. 08/13/02, 11:07 AM First, there is a systematic pattern of bias against small and medium firms in the full world sample. Overall, small firms report more problems than medium-sized firms, which in turn face more obstacles than large firms.
Second, the pattern of bias against small firms is most pronounced in Latin America and
the Caribbean and transition economies. This suggests that these areas might be prime targets of efforts to reduce size bias. However, the power to find significant differences in some of the other regions may be low due to data limitations. This comment applies with even more force to the country by country analysis. 24 Further country level analysis with larger data sets would surely be fruitful.
Third, the analysis of different obstacles reveals that the biases are quite consistent across obstacles. This means that leveling the playing field is necessary in almost all areas. The bias against small firms is pronounced in financing and this is probably the area where most efforts have been concentrated to date. The findings on taxes and regulations are somewhat difficult to interpret since (by the design of the survey) it is unclear if they refer to the level of 24 Regressions for separate countries are not shown in this paper, but can be seen in Schiffer & Weder (2001) .
08/13/02, 11:07 AM taxes, to the tax administration or to regulations in general. The finding that inflation is worse for smaller firms than for larger ones confirms the belief that sound macroeconomic management is important not only for overall growth in general but for the growth of small firms in particular. A similar finding relates to the exchange rate: small firms in East Asia, with a recent experience of devaluation and perhaps limited hedging possibilities, have suffered most. Then there are a series of obstacles that relate to the bureaucracy and property rights (corruption, street crime, organized crime) where, again, smaller firms report more problems than larger ones. Finally, there are those obstacles where we did not find differences according to firm size: policy instability and uncertainty, infrastructure and the judiciary. The fact that there are no significant differences among firms in their evaluation of policy uncertainty does not make this an irrelevant area for reform. To the contrary, when we look at the level of obstacles rather than differences among firms, policy uncertainty ranked among the top obstacles. In other words, higher policy stability will help firms of all sizes equally. Infrastructure and the judiciary, on the other hand ranked among the lowest obstacles in all regions.
Fourth, the patterns of results are robust. Controlling for firm age, foreign and government participation in ownership reduces the significance of the firm size dummies only slightly or not at all for most obstacles. The basic pattern that small firms are worse off than medium and larger ones remains very clearly.
08/13/02, 11:07 AM Finally, there are some interesting side results:
Firms with government participation in ownership face significantly fewer obstacles than non-private firms-with the notable exception of financing, where they have significantly more problems.
Foreign-owned firms report significantly fewer problems than local firms, for the most part.
This is an interesting finding in itself since the opposite finding would have been equally possible. However, it appears that the advantages of foreign firms (for instance, in bargaining with the government and their power to credibly threaten exit and relocation) dominate over possible disadvantages such as being unfamiliar with the local circumstances.
Firm's age matters less than expected. Older firms have better access to finance. However, for most other obstacles, firm age is not significant.
In summary, we find that a bias against small firms exists: small firms report more problems than medium-sized firms, which in turn face more obstacles than large firms.
Assuming that such a bias in the size distribution of firms is indeed damaging for economic development and poverty alleviation, this finding is consistent with programs of support for small and medium-sized enterprise. However, based on the information in the survey, we cannot establish the source of the bias. We cannot distinguish between market-induced problems for smaller firms (which may not necessarily warrant intervention) and government-induced problems, such as bureaucratic discrimination (which would warrant intervention and leveling of the playing field). Certainly this is one of the most important areas for further research.
